







Alternative views of quantum states are often expressed using the language of representation. 
For example, after titling his 2014 review article “Is the quantum state real?”, Leifer went on 
to say “The question of just what type of thing the quantum state, or wavefunction, 
represents, has been with us since the beginnings of quantum theory.” It is important to 
distinguish three questions here: What is a quantum state? How may a quantum state be 
represented? What, if anything, does a quantum state represent?  I shall defend answers to 
these questions against alternatives. In brief, a quantum state is an objective relational 
property of a physical system that describes neither its intrinsic physical properties nor 
anyone’s epistemic state. Since its primary role is to assign Born probabilities to certain 
physical events involving the system, a quantum state may be represented in quantum theory 
by any mathematical object that can play this role. If it represents anything, a quantum state 
represents the objective probabilities it yields in this way. 
 The paper continues like this. Section 2 surveys a variety of equivalent ways a 
quantum state may be represented in order to serve its function in quantum theory. Section 3 
argues that a quantum state is not a physical entity, while section 4 argues that it is not a 
physical magnitude. In section 5 I argue that a system’s quantum state does not represent its 
intrinsic physical properties or those of three-dimensional space. While few, if any, of these 
arguments are original or decisive, I take them to motivate consideration of an alternative that 
can help improve our understanding of quantum theory. So in section 6 I develop a relational 




contrasting this with Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics and QBism. In section 7 I 
ponder whether this makes a quantum state representational: in my sense it is representational 
and many quantum states are real. Section 8 says what quantum states may represent and why 
this makes them modal properties. In section 9 I show why quantum states give a naturalist a 
reason to reject Representationalism. 
 
2. How quantum states may be represented 
Schrödinger (1936) used the word ‘representative’ to refer to a wave function, but a quantum 
state may be represented by many different mathematical objects. A quantum state may be 
represented by a wave function in the Heisenberg, Schrödinger or interaction picture. This 
wave function may be in position, momentum or energy representation. In a Hilbert space of 
square-integrable functions it may be represented by an equivalence class of functions that 
differ only on a set of measure zero. It may be represented by a vector or a ray of vectors in 
an abstract Hilbert space: a more general class of quantum states then includes mixed states 
representable not by vectors but by density operators on the space. In algebraic quantum 
theory a quantum state is represented by a normed, positive, linear functional from a C* 
algebra into the complex numbers. The von Neumann algebra of bounded linear operators on 
a Hilbert space admits representations of states that cannot even be represented by density 
operators. What all these different representations of a quantum state have in common is their 
role in yielding probabilities when (the appropriate form of) the Born rule is applied to them.
 The negative conclusion of this section is that it is both a category mistake and an 
unwarranted restriction on the scope of inquiry to identify the question “What does the 
quantum state represent?” with the question “What does the wave function represent?” But 




suggestion about what a quantum state is and what, if anything, it represents. 
 Generating probabilities is a key role of a quantum state, no matter how that state is 
represented. This suggests a preliminary answer to the nature of quantum states: a quantum 
state is whatever it takes to generate the Born probabilities it represents. I think this is 
basically the right answer, though more needs to be said to clarify and justify it. 
 
3. Quantum states are not physical entities 
One objection arises immediately. If all a quantum state does is to yield a bunch of 
probabilities then that state is not real: but we should accept the reality of a central posit of a 
spectacularly successful theory like quantum theory. 
 What lies behind this objection is a conception of what it is for a central posit of a 
physical theory to be real. Oxygen is posited as a physical entity by a successful theory of 
combustion, and to say that it is real is to say that the physical world contains such an entity. 
On this conception, quantum states would be real if and only if the physical world contains 
such entities as quantum states. But (the objector continues) probabilities are not physical 
entities1, and if all a quantum state does is to generate probabilities then it is not real either. 
 I’ll defend the reality of quantum states in section 7 and the objective probabilities 
they yield in section 8. But first, in deciding whether they are real, quantum states should not 
be thought of as (potential) physical entities. 
 A typical physical entity such as a speck of dust or a sample of oxygen bears physical 
properties and relations and has physical parts, all of which may change with time. It interacts 
                                                 
1When the subjectivist statistician Bruno De Finetti (1974) famously wrote 
PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST he meant to deny that the physical world contains any 




causally with other physical entities. Typical physical events are also entities with physical 
properties, relations and parts: They have spatiotemporal locations and they interact causally 
with other physical entities. Atypical physical entities may lack some of these characteristics. 
Democritus’s atoms had no parts and their intrinsic properties did not change, though their 
changing spatial relations were supposed to underlie all other physical change; classical 
physics contemplated point events with no spatiotemporal extent and fields located 
everywhere in spacetime. 
 By contrast, a quantum state has no physical properties, relations or parts: it has no 
spatiotemporal location and does not interact causally. These claims may be disputed. The 
ground state of a hydrogen atom is often depicted as an electron cloud of varying density 
surrounding a central proton. But this does not locate the state itself, but merely represents 
the position-probability distribution (or probability amplitude—a real number in this case) for 
the electron in accordance with the Born rule. 
 Some views privilege a particular representation of a quantum state. Ney (2020) 
advocates wave function realism, according to which the wave function of the universe 
represents a field in a high-dimensional configuration space. For a wave function realist, this 
field is a physical entity occupying the whole of this high-dimensional analogue of the 
ordinary three-dimensional space alleged to emerge from it dynamically. The universal wave 
function is supposed to act on matter (represented by a point in configuration space), 
confirming its physicality. But wave function realism does not square well with how 
physicists typically use quantum states in all forms of quantum theory, not to represent the 
entire universe all at once but to predict and explain the behavior of selected physical 
subsystems (such as the proton, helium atom, or ammonia molecule; superfluid helium-3, a 




using these to generate probabilities concerning them and their four-dimensional spacetime 
environment. There is nothing in these applications to warrant privileging a configuration-
space wave function as representative of the quantum states assigned, or to show these states 
are physical entities. 
 
4. Quantum states are not physical magnitudes 
Bell (2004) introduced the term ‘beable’ to refer to whatever a theory takes to be physically 
real—as what may be “described in ‘classical terms’, because they are there.” As examples 
he mentioned the settings of switches and knobs and currents needed to prepare an unstable 
nucleus. These are not physical entities; each is a physical magnitude. The famous EPR paper 
(1935) used the phrase ‘element of physical reality’ to refer to such quantities in arguing that 
there are some that quantum mechanics fails to describe. Perhaps quantum states are 
themselves such elements of reality—real physical magnitudes, not real physical entities? 
 Wallace and Timpson’s (2010) spacetime state realism suggests that a density 
operator is a magnitude representing a spacetime region’s physical properties the way a real 
number T represents a room’s temperature properties. Anticipating an incredulous stare, 
Wallace and Timpson say (op. cit., p. 710): 
There need be no reason to blanche at an ontology merely because the basic properties 
are represented by such objects: we know of no rule of segregation which states that 
only those mathematical items to which one is introduced sufficiently early on in the 
schoolroom get to count as possible representatives of physical quantities, for 
example! 
 If general relativity represents a quantity in a region of spacetime by an order-two tensor 




spacetime by a density operator on a Hilbert space? 
 There is a good answer. Each component of the stress-energy tensor field at a 
spacetime point gives the flux at that point of a 4-momentum component across a 3-
hypersurface. Each of the 16 components of this tensor in a coordinate system has a real-
numbered value on a common cardinal scale to satisfy the tensor’s transformation properties. 
The components of any tensorial magnitude (scalar, vector, or higher order) have values on 
some cardinal scale. But a density operator on a Hilbert space is none of these, and its matrix 
elements in a basis for that space are not the values of any magnitude on any cardinal scale. A 
quantum state is not a physically real magnitude. 
 
5. A quantum state does not represent any (intrinsic) physical properties 
The instantaneous physical state of a system of n classical particles may be represented by a 
point in a 6n-dimensional phase space that determines the value of every other dynamical 
variable of the system. Associated with each measurable region of phase space is a physical 
property that the system possesses just in case the phase space point representing its state lies 
in that region. Some have thought a system’s quantum state plays an analogous role in 
quantum theory with phase space replaced by Hilbert space, each subspace N of which is 
associated with a physical property the system definitely has if the density operator W 
representing its state projects onto N but otherwise has only with probability given by TrWPN, 
where PN is the projection operator uniquely corresponding to N. 
 But the analogy between phase space and Hilbert space as bearers of a probability 
measure breaks down as a consequence of results due to Gleason (1957) and others. Gleason 
proved that the only measures on (closed) subspaces of a Hilbert space of dimension greater 




that it assigns either 0 or 1 to each subspace in a way that can be interpreted as saying which 
properties corresponding to subspaces are possessed and which are not. These negative 
results show that a quantum state does not represent a system’s physical properties the way a 
phase space point represents the dynamical properties of a classical system. Attempts to 
evade this conclusion by adopting a kind of quantum logic governing reasoning about 
statements assigning physical properties to a quantum system have the character of a 
degenerating interpretative research program. 
 But the framework of ontological models (see Harrigan and Spekkens (2010), Leifer 
(2014)) explores the possibility that a quantum state yields a probability distribution over 
some space of random variables, perhaps of a wholly novel kind, the points of which may be 
parametrized by a variable λ whose value more completely describes the system assigned that 
quantum state. In that framework, Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (PBR) (2012) proved a result 
they took to show both that suitably prepared quantum states are physically real and that they 
are properties of the systems so prepared. 
 The basic assumption of the ontological models framework is that after the quantum 
state of a system has been prepared, the value of the variable λΛ provides a complete 
specification of the physical properties of that system. But a preparation procedure for a state 
represented by vector ψ may yield one of many distinct real states λ, with a probability 
distribution μψ(λ) on Λ. So distinct quantum states ψ1, ψ2 result in different distributions 
μ1(λ), μ2(λ). These might or might not overlap: if they did, then distinct quantum states would 
be compatible with the same underlying real state λ. The parameter λ is also supposed to 
specify a fine-grained probability measure over all possible outcomes of measurements of 
magnitudes (“observables”) to which a quantum state assigns a probability via the Born rule. 




weighted by the distribution μψ(λ) over the space Λ. 
 For PBR, the variable λ represents the real state of a system assigned a quantum state 
represented by ψ following some preparation procedure. They consider a state represented by 
λ to be physically real because:  
(1) it determines all actual physical properties of the system, and 
(2) for each observable, it determines a probability distribution over the possible outcomes of 
a measurement of that observable. 
Assuming that systems that are prepared independently have independent physical states, 
PBR proved that the quantum state assigned to each system is uniquely determined by the 
value of λ that provides a complete specification of the actual physical properties of that 
system. Because it is determined by the physically real state λ, they conclude that this 
quantum state is also a physically real property of the system. 
 But the proof establishes its conclusion only if a system has a state meeting both 
conditions (1) and (2). The ontological models framework simply assumes that it does. But a 
quantum state meeting condition (2) may be real even though it does not meet condition (1): 
and (pace PBS) a system may have a real physical state meeting condition (1) but not 
condition (2). The PBR theorem does not show that a quantum state is a physical property of 
the system to which it is assigned. 
 Some views of quantum theory assign a descriptive function to a privileged universal 
quantum state. For non-relativistic quantum mechanics this would be the state of all n 
particles in the universe (for some finite n). Monton (2006) takes this universal quantum state 
to be pure, and to determine a holistic physical property of the universe through the eigenstate 
→ eigenvalue link: the universe’s particles have property P at time t if its state vector |ψ(t)> 




description were complete, then no particle would ever have a precise position, since a well-
defined configuration-space wave-function has no corresponding projection operator. But 
some take Bohmian mechanics to offer a clear version of non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
that also includes a precise trajectory for every particle in the universe determined by a 
universal wave-function ψ(x1, x2, ..., xn, t) in accordance with a law sometimes called the 
Bohmian guidance equation. 
 This universal wave-function can then be understood either to represent a holistic 
physical property of the n particles at t, or to represent an n-place physical relation among the 
points of space they then occupy. The latter option has been called the multi-field conception 
of the wave function (by Belot (2012)), as opposed to viewing it as a field on configuration 
space. The former option has been proposed as a way of fleshing out a so-called nomological 
conception of the wave function—as something required to state the law determining particle 
trajectories. The idea here is to regard this holistic property of the particles as a disposition 
grounding that law (see Esfeld et al. (2014)).2 
 The main problem I see with either of these options is that it applies only in the 
artificially restricted context of a particular take on non-relativistic quantum mechanics that 
assumes the existence of a universal wave function. But quantum theory is applied much 
more widely outside of that context, where the quantum state of a system is not represented 
by a wave function and it is not assumed that there is any universal wave function. Quantum 
states play their role in all applications without that assumption. 
 
6. A quantum state is an extrinsically physical property of a system 
                                                 
2 Suarez (2015) has proposed an “intermediate” view with a dispositional velocity 




A property may be either intrinsic or extrinsic to its bearer. Mass is an intrinsic property of an 
electron (at least according to classical physics)—a property it has in and of itself, without 
regard to the existence or properties of anything else: Being lighter than a proton is an 
extrinsic property because it involves the electron’s relation to the proton. Here this is a 
physical relation to something physical: I’ll call such an extrinsic property extrinsically 
physical. Being married is an extrinsic property but it is not extrinsically physical since it also 
involves a person’s social or legal relations to another. These change with the death of a 
distant spouse but this is no instantaneous action at a distance since it involves no immediate 
change in the person’s intrinsic properties. 
 Having a particular position or velocity is not an intrinsic property of a classical 
particle insofar as it implicitly depends on its relation to a reference frame. To highlight the 
contrast with a system’s quantum state I shall ignore this complication and treat these and all 
other classical dynamical properties determined by a system’s phase space point as intrinsic 
properties. But a quantum state is an extrinsically physical, not an intrinsic, property of a 
physical system. 
 QBists and others regard a quantum state as a state of knowledge or opinion of an 
agent and take this to imply that it is not a property of the system to which the agent assigns 
it. The system does have the extrinsic property of being assigned that state by that agent. But 
this is not an extrinsically physical property because it depends on an intentional relation to 
an agent, not a physical relation to a physical object or situation. 
 A quantum state is ontic in Leifer’s (2014) sense, and not a state of knowledge or 
opinion of some agent (though an agent may come to know this state). 
...an ontic state refers to something that objectively exists in the world, independently 




exist if all intelligent beings were suddenly wiped out from the universe.  op. cit. p.69 
Because a quantum state is an extrinsically physical property, a system in given 
circumstances may have more than one quantum state, each relative to a different physical 
relatum. But a system has a quantum state only relative to something physical. 
 Everything in the previous paragraph accords with Rovelli’s (1996) relational 
quantum mechanics. For Rovelli, the physical item relative to which a system has a quantum 
state is a distinct physical system. He maintains that just as "the observer" to which velocities 
must be relativized in Galilean relativity may be any physical object (such as a table lamp), 
so also "the observer" to which the state of a physical system must be relativized in quantum 
mechanics may be any physical system (such as an electron). In his view 
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the physical description of physical systems 
relative to other systems, and this is a complete description of the world. (1996, p. 
1650) 
But it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile this view with the objectivity of physical 
description in quantum theory. 
 By examining how quantum states are used in applications of quantum theory one can 
arrive at a better relational view. Quantum theory is applied not in order to describe a 
physical system but in order to assign probabilities to a range of statements about it. Such a 
probability assignment is useful for an agent in a particular physical situation whose physical 
conditions make it impossible to determine which statement in that range is true. What makes 
a quantum state an extrinsically physical property of a system is not its relation to another 
physical system but to such a physical situation. A system has a quantum state relative to a 
physical situation because of features of the physical environment that constrain the 




is why a system’s quantum state is ontic and not epistemic: to say the system has that state is 
not to say what any observer knows, believes or suspects of it. 
 A localized agent has direct epistemic access only to the contents of their momentary 
past light-cone: but this may permit indirect epistemic access to events outside it. Quantum 
theory mediates this access because a quantum state relative to the agent’s momentary 
spacetime location yields probabilities concerning such possible events. Bohm’s version of 
the EPR Gedankenexperiment provides a memorable illustration of such relativity. 
 A pair of spin ½ particles has a physically extrinsic property represented by the spin-
singlet state vector. The z-spin component of particle R is measured with spin-up outcome. 
Relative to points to the (absolute) future of that R-measurement event, the quantum spin 
state of the L particle is represented by the vector |↓>z, a spin-down z-spin eigenstate: but 
relative to other points, L’s spin state is represented by a reduced density operator—the two 
dimensional identity operator I.  
 |↓>z and I each represent the state of particle L (relative to different spacetime 
locations), and the change from I to |↓>z is not a physical event, caused by the measurement 
on particle R. It is a change in relativization from one spacetime region to another to 
accommodate the change in physical situation of any agent Alice whose world-line entered 
the future of the z-spin measurement on particle R. As her physical situation changed, so 
would the quantum state that such a (merely hypothetical) Alice should assign to particle L to 
yield the relevant Born probabilities for her new situation. The spin-up outcome on R is the 
physical reason why any such Alice should update her quantum state for L after gaining 
access to new information about what happened to R. 
 The spacetime location of an actual or merely hypothetical agent may present a less 




Wigner’s friend, Wigner has no informational access to the contents of his isolated friend’s 
laboratory and so cannot observe the outcome of her quantum measurement even when this 
does lie in his past light-cone. The Schrödinger picture state vector of his friend’s laboratory 
evolves unitarily relative to Wigner’s physical situation so after her measurement the system 
she measured has a mixed quantum state relative to this external physical situation. But this is 
consistent with that system’s having a pure quantum state relative to the physical situation of 
his friend after she has measured it. 
 
7. Is a quantum state representational? 
The term ‘representational’ has been used in recent discussions to classify opposed views of 
the nature of quantum states.3 The pragmatist view of quantum states I have taken elsewhere 
(2012a, 2017a, 2017b) and assumed here has sometimes been classified as non-
representational. But usage has not been consistent. To clear the air I shall distinguish several 
possible senses of the term while explaining an important sense in which a quantum state is 
representational in this view. 
 A quantum state could count as representational simply by being represented by a 
wave function or other mathematical object. Since representation is an intentional concept, a 
quantum state would then count as representational whether or not it exists. A quantum state 
is representational in this minimal sense whether or not it is real, and so are the philosophers’ 
stone, caloric and the properties of being dephlogisticated or at absolute rest. 
 One could choose to say that a quantum state is non-representational if a quantum 
state is neither a physical entity nor magnitude and does not represent a system’s intrinsic 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Krissmer (2018), Bub (2019), Wallace (2019) and several papers 




physical properties. Since sections 3-5 ruled out these views of a quantum state one would 
then call a quantum state non-representational. 
 An alternative use of ‘representational’ ties it to truth-aptness. Emotivists claimed that 
an ethical statement such as “Stealing money is wrong” expresses an emotion rather than 
stating a fact and so cannot be evaluated for truth. They maintained that despite its subject-
predicate form, this statement is not truth-apt and the term ‘wrong’ is non-representational. 
Similarly, someone could deny that a statement ascribing quantum state ψ to a system is 
truth-apt and so the predicate ‘being in quantum state ψ’ counts as non-representational, on 
the grounds that this statement does not state a fact but expresses an epistemic attitude. 
 But while the primary function of a statement ascribing a quantum state to a system is 
not to describe or represent that system’s intrinsic physical properties, that statement does 
have a truth-value (relative to an appropriate physical situation), since a quantum state is an 
extrinsically physical property of a system. In this sense, a quantum state is representational. 
Indeed, a statement ascribing a quantum state to a system is useful only to the extent that 
statement is true (true enough, that is: see Elgin (2017)) and so the state is real. It is because 
there are many such statements ascribing a quantum state to a system that I consider those 
quantum states to be real. 
 Wallace (French and Saatsi, p.87) has offered yet another understanding of what it is 
for a quantum state to be representational. He considers  
the classic Schrödinger-cat state α |live cat> +  β |dead cat> which unitary quantum 
theory can straightforwardly produce. If the quantum state can be understood 
representationally—that is, if distinct quantum states correspond to distinct objective 
ways a physical system can be—and if the theory is unsupplemented by hidden 




simultaneously alive and dead. 
Since a quantum state is an extrinsically physical property of a system, that system may have 
distinct quantum states, each relative to a different physical situation. There is nothing 
subjective about its having these ontic states, and in that sense each represents a distinctive 
objective way for that system to be. But a cat’s death certainly involves a change in its 
intrinsic physical properties. The passage suggests that two ways a physical system can be 
count as objectively distinct only if these involve incompatible intrinsic physical properties of 
that system. 
 Entanglement-swapping features quantum states that count as non-representational on 
this narrower understanding of objective distinctness (see Healey (2017b)). In entanglement 
swapping a particular pure entangled state is assigned to a system after a measurement is 
performed on a second, distant system: which state is assigned depends on the outcome of 
that measurement. Assuming it is a local event, in the absence of retro- or spacelike causation 
the distant measurement does not alter any intrinsic property of the first system. So it has the 
same intrinsic physical properties no matter which of two or more distinct pure quantum 
states it is assigned. In that sense, these distinct quantum states do not correspond to distinct 
objective ways that physical system can be. That is why these states count as non-
representational in this narrow sense of objective distinctness. 
 But there are other cases in which a quantum state is assigned to a system following a 
procedure that is said to prepare or put the system into that state, suggesting that being in this 
quantum state involves having associated intrinsic physical properties. A Stern-Gerlach (SG) 
experiment is a paradigm of such a procedure. Spin ½ atoms in a beam may be detected by 
one of two detectors placed on the z-axis symmetrically above and below the incoming beam 




Replaced by some experimental equipment, any atom that is subsequently detected in this 
experiment is said to have been prepared in a quantum spin eigenstate |↑> z through its local 
interaction with the magnetic field.  
 Naively, the incoming beam has been split by the magnet into an upper “wave-
packet” of positive z-spin atoms and a lower “wave-packet” of negative z-spin atoms. But as 
Wigner (1963) pointed out, unitary evolution of the quantum state vector during passage 
through the magnet results in an entangled superposition of the translational and spin 
quantum states of the atoms. Wessels (1997) called passage through a z-oriented SG magnet a 
mere pseudo-preparation of z-spin eigenstates in upper and lower beams on the grounds that 
the (reduced) quantum spin state of emerging atoms was therefore a mixture rather than a 
pure state. She noted that something similar is true of most if not all actual laboratory 
preparation procedures. 
 But these are real state preparations, involving a local interaction warranting 
assignment of a superposed state followed by a conceptual selection of one component with a 
view to a possible later local measurement-type interaction involving the target system. The 
selected state does not represent an intrinsic property of this system (like positive z-spin). A 
different selection would not have represented a different intrinsic property: it would merely 
have selected the state relative to a different possible subsequent local measurement-type 
interaction. State preparation does not prepare a system’s intrinsic physical properties.4 
                                                 
4The state of an individual system can sometimes be prepared with no selection step 
by controlling its interactions with its environment, as in laser cooling or just letting the 
system relax when coupled to a vacuum (Fröhlich and Schubnel, 2016). While it is tempting 
to conclude this works by modifying its intrinsic properties, certification of the procedure by 




8. What quantum states may represent, and why this makes them modal 
A quantum state is an extrinsically physical property of a physical system. It is 
representational in the sense that a statement ascribing this property to a system is truth-apt 
and may be true; when it is true, that state is objectively real, like a speck of dust. But a speck 
of dust does not represent anything: does a quantum state? In my (2017b) I said that if a 
quantum state represents anything, it is the objective probabilistic relations between its 
backing conditions and its advice conditions. Backing conditions describe physical situations 
and processes on which the state supervenes: advice conditions are magnitude claims of the 
form MΔ to which the Born rule assigns probabilities when legitimately applied. This 
requires the system to be involved in an appropriate interaction—one modeled by rapid and 
robust decoherence of a quantum state.5  
 Once one understands the function of a quantum state it matters little whether one 
chooses to say that it represents the objective probabilistic relations between its backing 
conditions and its advice conditions. Many true statements supervene on these backing 
conditions. What distinguishes a statement assigning a system’s quantum state is that it 
implies objective probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and its advice 
conditions via the Born rule. Since probability is a modal concept—a quantified possibility—
if a system has a quantum state this means that this statement has modal content because it 
implies many modal statements. 
 What makes Born probabilities objective is not that they are determined by all local 
matters of particular fact but that they offer authoritative advice to any user of quantum 
theory on how to set their credences (coherent degrees of belief) in magnitude claims in a 
physical situation that blocks any more direct epistemic access to the truth of those claims. 
                                                 




The advice carries this authority insofar as adjusting one’s credences to accord with Born 
probabilities is on the whole the most reliable way of forming expectations in a situation of 
uncertainty. 
 Objective probabilities arise outside of quantum theory, in statistical physics and so-
called games of chance. The function of probability is to guide belief (and hence action) in a 
situation of uncertainty: different situations require different objective probabilities, in 
applications of quantum theory and elsewhere. A probability could not adequately serve this 
function if its value were determined by any actual frequency because following its guidance 
may not yield the expected results, even in the long term. A quantum state has modal content 
because its function is to yield modal objective probabilities. This content is doubly modal 
because these probabilities concern sets of possibilities, where each set pertains to a different 
hypothetical decoherence context, at most one of which is actual. 
 
9. Representationalism and the quantum state 
Price (2011, 2013) has argued in favor of a distinctive view he calls subject naturalism by 
contrast with object naturalism. The object naturalist holds that ultimately all there is is the 
world of science and that all genuine knowledge is scientific knowledge. The subject 
naturalist instead maintains that philosophy needs to begin with what science tells us about 
ourselves—that we are natural creatures, and that philosophy must proceed by 
acknowledging this fact. 
 An object naturalist has a proto-theory about language involving the assumption of: 
Representationalism: The function of statements is to represent ‘worldly’ states of 
affairs and...true statements succeed in doing so. (Price (2013), p. 24) 




discourse and the sparse world apparently described by science. For there are many 
apparently true statements that don’t seem to line up neatly with facts of the kind uncovered 
by natural science. These include not only normative statements, in ethics and elsewhere, but 
also statements about probability, possibility and causation—even when these occur within 
science itself. 
 Statements attributing quantum states to physical systems provide a striking 
illustration within fundamental science of the superiority of subject naturalism over an object 
naturalism burdened with Representationalism. For one who accepts quantum theory, the 
fundamental facts about the world are stated by magnitude claims. Truths about quantum 
states are not magnitude claims, although they supervene on them. The function of a 
statement attributing a quantum state is not to represent a ‘worldly’ state of affairs, even 
though many such statements are true. Representationalism fails for these statements. 
 The function of a quantum state is to offer good advice to any suitably-placed agent 
on how to set credences concerning magnitude claims whose truth-values they are not in a 
position to determine more directly. This function is exercised through application to the 
quantum state of the Born rule and adjustment of credences to match the probabilities it 
yields. Science tells us that we (and potentially other kinds of agents) are spatiotemporally 
localized natural creatures whose physical situation limits epistemic access to many physical 
states of affairs. Such an agent is able reliably to improve its epistemic state with respect to a 
physical system by applying the Born rule to the appropriate quantum state for one in the 
agent’s physical situation. For each such situation this yields a plethora of probability 
distributions, each pertaining to a possible circumstance in which the system may find itself. 






Bell, J. S. (2004) Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, Revised edition. 
(Cambridge University Press). 
Belot, G. (2012) “Quantum states for primitive ontologists”, European Journal for 
Philosophy of Science 2:67–83. 
Bub, J. (2019) “What Is Really There in the Quantum World?” in A. Cordero (ed.) 
Philosophers Look at Quantum Mechanics (Switzerland: Springer Nature): 217–33. 
De Finetti, B. (1968) ‘Probability: The Subjectivistic Approach’, in R. Klibansky (ed.), 
La Philosophie Contemporaine, (Firenze: La Nuova Italia): 45–53. 
Einstein, A., Podolosky, B., and Rosen, N. (1935) (EPR) “Can Quantum-Mechanical 
Description of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?” Physical Review 47: 777–80. 
Elgin, C. (2017) True Enough (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
Esfeld, M., Lazarovici, D., Hubert, M., and Dürr, D. (2014) “The ontology of Bohmian 
Mechanics”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65: 773-796.  
French S. and Saatsi, J. (2020) Scientific Realism and the Quantum (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Fröhlich, J. and Schubnel, B. (2016) “The Preparation of States in Quantum 
Mechanics”, Journal of Mathematical Physics 57, 042101. 
Gleason, A.M. (1957) "Measures on the Closed Subspaces of a Hilbert Space", 
Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 17: 59–81. 
Glick, D., Darby, G. and Marmodoro, A. (2020) The Foundation of Reality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
Harrigan N. and Spekkens R.W (2010) “Einstein, incompleteness, and the epistemic view of 




Healey, R. (2012a) “Quantum Theory: A Pragmatist Approach”, British. Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 63, 729–771. 
Healey, R. (2012b) “Quantum Decoherence in a Pragmatist View: Dispelling Feynman’s 
Mystery”, Foundations of Physics 42:1534–1555. 
Healey, R. (2017a) The Quantum Revolution in Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
Healey, R. (2017b) “Quantum States as Objective Informational Bridges”, Foundations of 
Physics 47:161–173. 
Hemmo, M. and Shenker, O. (2020) Quantum, Probability, Logic (Switzerland: Springer 
Nature). 
Krissmer, R. (2018) “Representation Lost: The Case for a Relational Interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics”, Entropy 20, 975 
Leifer, M. (2014) “Is the Quantum State Real? An Extended Review of Ψ-ontology 
Theorems”, Quanta 3: 67–155. 
Monton, B. (2006) “Quantum mechanics and 3N-dimensional space”, Philosophy of Science 
73: 778–789. 
Ney, A. (2020) The World in the Wave Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Price, H. (2011) Naturalism Without Mirrors (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Price, H. (2013) Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationialism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Pusey MF, Barrett J, and Rudolph T. (2012). “On the reality of the quantum state”. Nature 
Physics 8:475–478. 
Rovelli, C. (1996) “Relational Quantum Mechanics”, International Journal of Theoretical 




Suarez, M. (2015) “Bohmian dispositions”, Synthese 192: 3203-3228.  
Wallace, D. (2020) “On the Plurality of Quantum Theories”, in French and Saatsi (2020): 78–
102. 
Wallace D. and Timpson, C. (2010) “Quantum Mechanics on Spacetime I: Spacetime State 
Realism”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61, 697–727. 
Wessels, L. (1997): ‘The Preparation Problem in Quantum Mechanics’, in J. Earman and 
J. Norton (eds), The Cosmos of Science, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 243–
273. 
Wigner, E. (1963) “The problem of measurement”, American Journal of Physics 31, 6–15. 
